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ABSTRACT: A variety of theoretical and epistemological perspectives on the notion of argument has 
contributed towards the development of numerous text analysis systems in contemporary argumentation 
research, making the selection of an analytic model for the description and evaluation of arguments in natural 
language contexts a complex task for researchers.  Not surprisingly, Western scholars have overwhelmingly 
relied on Anglo- and Euro-centric models of argumentation as normative references of argument structure and 
quality in a variety of research contexts, disregarding plurality of practice within socio-cultural contexts.  I will 
discuss how the findings of my own research, in which I examine the rhetorical styles of Australian and 
Japanese students’ academic writing in English, have led me to suggest an approach towards argument analysis 
that accommodates the variety of rhetorical styles found in my studies of academic writing and contributes 
towards a useful account of the functions and structures of academic argument in contemporary tertiary texts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In modern composition research, notions of argument are predominantly grounded in 
rhetorical theories that promote the persuasive character and communicative purposes of 
language.  Toulmin’s (1958) model of informal reasoning and the ‘new rhetoric’ of Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) and Perelman (1982) have become particularly influential in the 
teaching and evaluation of argumentative writing for native English speakers at U.S. colleges 
and universities, which has seen argumentation become almost synonymous with persuasion 
in contemporary writing pedagogy and research.  Rhetorical theory has also significantly 
influenced developments in applied linguistic research.  A revival of persuasion in discourse 
classification systems (Kinneavy, 1971) and the emergence of contrastive rhetorical research 
in the 1960s (Kaplan, 1966) stimulated research of persuasive discourse and cross-cultural 
research of argumentative and persuasive writing.  Consequently, a variety of text analysis 
systems developed by linguists (Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Aston, 1977; Martin, 1985; 
Lautamatti, 1987; Tirkkonen-Condit, 1987; Crismore, 1993) has been applied in many 
contemporary argument studies.   
In most of the studies of argumentation in students’ writing, Western scholars have 
limited their inquiry to investigations of i) the strategies of persuasion, and ii) the organising 
structure of persuasive discourse.  Moreover, the widespread application in argument analysis 
and pedagogy of Toulmin’s (1958) model of informal argument, devised from Western 
judicial justificatory practices, confirms an ethnocentric predisposition in contemporary 
argument scholarship.  In fact, the use by researchers of a model of prototypical argument 
structure discounts the variety of structures of argument that might exist within a cultural or 
disciplinary context.  Yet, any emphasis on discerning cross-cultural differences in the types 
of logical patterns employed in written texts has resulted in a tendency to stereotype the 
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rhetorical patterns of particular cultural groups and ignore the varieties of rhetorical structures 
that exist within particular groups of writers (Kubota, 1997).   
Today, contrastive rhetoric and second language writing researchers are extending 
beyond purely linguistic frameworks to accommodate not only linguistic variables of text but 
also cognitive and socio-cultural variables of writing.  Consequently, approaches to discourse 
analysis are becoming more pragmatic as texts are interpreted not in isolation but in terms of 
their situational contexts and purposes.  This has led to discrepancies among researchers in 
definitions concerned with the nature, forms and functions of arguments in written texts, with 
empirical descriptions emphasizing the cultural and contextual specificity of argument 
practices and de-emphasizing normative standards (Siegel, 1999). Distinctions between 
argument and persuasion are also challenging the over reliance on rhetorical approaches to 
the analysis of argument in extended discourse and promoting enquiry into the relationships 
between rational argumentation, rhetoric and dialectic and their influence on the 
interpretations of argument structures and functions (Rescher, 1998).  Moving beyond 
existing analytic frameworks, which depict argumentation as merely persuasion, and 
designing frameworks that accommodate diversity in argumentative practices appears 
essential for generating meaningful descriptions of authentic arguments.  
In my study, I am examining the use of arguments in the coursework essays written as 
part of the normal course requirements by a group of six Japanese native speakers and seven 
Australian English native speakers enrolled in an Australian tertiary undergraduate 
humanities program.  The study is a qualitative case study investigation of writing in 
naturally occurring academic contexts, supplemented by semi-structured, text-based 
interviews with the students while they were writing their essays to determine the social and 
cognitive processes that drive argument construction and to validate the identification, 
interpretation and reconstruction of the arguments in their written discourse.  My initial 
analysis suggests that models of argument previously applied in composition research fail to 
accommodate the characteristic functions and structures of academic argument and the 
diversity of argumentative practices that exist among first and second language 
undergraduate writers of English.  In particular, Toulmin’s (1958) model of informal 
argument does not accommodate the persuasive strategies employed by students in their 
academic texts, suggesting that i) an alternative analytic framework is required to explore 
structures of persuasion in students’ texts, and ii) persuasion may not be the singular goal of 
academic argumentation.  I propose, therefore, an analytic model for describing the functions 
and structures of arguments in students’ academic writing, which integrates rational, 
rhetorical and dialectical properties relevant to the academic context.   
 
1. USES OF ACADEMIC ARGUMENT 
 
A predominant view among rhetoricians, composition theorists and argumentation scholars is 
that the primary purpose of argumentation is persuasion (Meiland, 1989).  Blair (2004) 
proposes that if we conceive argumentation in general terms, as an activity aimed at the 
rational alteration or modification of a position, standpoint or attitude, then at least five 
primary uses of argument may be identified: 1) proof or demonstration, 2) justification, 3) 
persuasion, 4) inquiry, and 5) resolution of a disagreement (Blair, 2004).  Important in Blair’s 
(2004) conception of argumentation and the use of arguments is the notion that 
argumentation is a teleological practice not limited to persuasion, which bears important 
implications for the design of analytic models of argument.  
I posit that of the five primary uses of argument identified by Blair (2004), 
persuasion, justification and inquiry may all contribute toward the goals of argumentative 
practices in students’ academic settings.  I do not consider proof-demonstration and 
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disagreement-resolution to be among the types of arguments used by students in their 
academic texts.   Most naturally occurring arguments are not deductively valid so, as Blair 
(2004) points out, arguments used for proof or demonstration are reserved for specialized 
contexts, such as ‘philosophical scholarly argumentation in the analytic tradition’ (Blair, 
2004, p. 23).  Negotiation appears integral to arguments used for disagreement-resolution so, 
although written arguments may be modelled as internal dialogues with dialectical processes, 
it does not appear to me possible to accommodate the mutual decision-making process of 
disagreement-resolution without an active dialogue.   
The functions of academic argument may be specified according to the following 
definitions:  
1.1.1) Persuasion is the use of arguments to make a reader believe a certain position and so 
adopt some attitude or decision to do something. 
1.1.2) Justification is the use of arguments to show grounds for knowledge claims, especially 
when they are questionable or challengeable. 
1.1.3) Inquiry is the use of arguments to determine the merits of arguments identified as 
being relevant to a hypothesis or position on an issue. 
Gage (1996) emphasizes the fundamental distinction Meiland (1989) makes between 
persuasion and inquiry, stating that ‘persuasion implies prior commitment to an idea; inquiry 
implies a search that may or may not lead to such a commitment’ (Gage, 1996, p. 5).  In 
inquiry, therefore, a writer investigates the merits of a position or hypothesis without 
necessarily establishing a position or reaching a conclusion whereas in both justification and 
persuasion, a writer establishes a position and uses arguments to support it.  Persuasion and 
justification are distinguished by the fact that in persuasion, the writer seeks a concession 
from the readers to adopt the established position of the argument whereas in justification, the 
writer does not hold the expectation that the readers will necessarily adopt the writer’s 
propositions (Blair, 2004).  Persuasion may be further distinguished from justification by the 
characteristics of its academic register which, compared with justificatory discourse, tends to 
be more interpersonally charged, exhibit greater emotional investment in the advocated 
position, and assume a distinct lexico-grammatical system (Coffin, 2004).   
A classification system of argument raises the question of whether or not there is a 
predilection for one type of argument in academic contexts.  In academic contexts, 
argumentation is not considered to be an activity concerned merely with the generation and 
justification of opinions but rather one that is inextricably linked with the maintenance and 
production of knowledge.  In addition, scholars generally perceive academic discourse to be a 
type of discourse that holds a specialized mode of argument wherein writers are expected to 
place more import on rational than rhetorical conventions by demonstrating ‘absolute truth, 
empirical evidence, or flawless logic’ (Hyland, 2001, p. 549).  Since most of the analytic 
models applied in composition research to date have been based on models of persuasive 
argument, it seems relevant to propose an alternative approach to the analysis of academic 
argument. 
In fact, according to Meiland (1989), the primary function of argumentation in tertiary 
contexts is not persuasion but inquiry, which is consistent with the views of Peters (1986), a 
writing research scholar, who states that writing in academic situations involves ‘exploring 
the complexities of the subject or field, rather than challenging the convictions of the 
unknown reader’ (Peters, 1986, p. 170).  The view that argumentation has a knowledge 
building function appears consistent with the heuristic goals of the coursework essay, which 
many academics in Western tertiary programs regard as an effective instrument for learning.  
In fact, if we regard inquiry as an heuristic form of reasoning, we should acknowledge that 
inquiry probably entails processes of abductive reasoning, whereby ‘scientists and other 
professionals appropriate or connect with the thinking or observations of others to produce 
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new lines of thought’ (Warnick and Manusov, 2000, p. 387).   Inquiry appears, in this sense, 
to be a useful mechanism for formulating new knowledge. 
Justification, however, would also appear to be an important goal of academic writers 
concerned with showing that the reasons for asserting their claims to knowledge are sound 
and, consequently, tenable.  When the primary use of arguments is for justification, the writer 
puts forth a claim to knowledge and is concerned with demonstrating why it is reasonable for 
the writer to believe the claim in question (Blair, 2004).  In inquiry, though, a writer, in spite 
of passing judgment on the merits of the claims advanced by other scholars in the 
epistemological context of inquiry, does not necessarily purport to have reached a definitive 
conclusion and, in some instances, after considering the knowledge advanced by other 
scholars may only advance a tentative hypothesis.  Compared with inquiry, therefore, 
justification appears to be more important in academic texts focussed on confirming 
knowledge than on generating new perspectives on knowledge.    
I propose that contextual factors, including the specific nature of essay questions, 
disciplinary requirements, and interpretations of tasks, contribute to a student’s formulation 
of an argumentative goal, which subsequently influences the structures and strategies of their 
written arguments.  I also contend that in persuasion, justification and inquiry, distinct 
structures and strategies of academic argument are generated, which can be described with 
recourse to the rational, rhetorical and dialectical properties of argument. 
 
2. PROPERTIES OF ACADEMIC ARGUMENT 
 
2.1. Rational properties 
 
When investigating the logical properties of individual arguments, instead of formulating 
their descriptions of arguments on premise-conclusion structures, many researchers have 
elected to use Toulmin’s (1958) six-part argumentation model to describe the structures of 
informal reasoning in academic texts.  I contend that the adversarial character of Toulmin’s 
(1958) model is not compatible with the goals of all students’ academic argumentation, 
especially inquiry.  The model imposes a judicial procedure on the execution of argument and 
ultimately restricts our interpretation of argument structure and function.  I believe the 
fundamental goal of academic argument is consistent with the interpretation of Copi’s 
definition of argument proposed by Finocchiaro (2003), who states, ‘the purpose of the 
argument is to justify the conclusion by means of supporting reasons’ (Finocchiaro, 2003, p. 
22).  I assert that the basic premise-conclusion structure of argument gives us greater scope 
than Toulmin’s (1958) argument model for investigating and interpreting the illation of 
argument by allowing us to examine from a functional perspective ‘the special relationship 
that holds between premises or reasons and conclusion or thesis’ (Finocchiaro, 2003, p. 22) in 
the three types of academic argument, persuasion, justification and inquiry, which I will now 
explain.   
In persuasion, we can consider the premise-conclusion relationship to hold that the 
writer, whose goal is to have the readers adopt the writer’s position, presents reasons to 
persuade the readers that the conclusion is true and therefore worthy of belief.  In 
justification, the writer’s goal is to provide reasons that make the conclusion acceptable 
without necessarily altering the readers’ beliefs.  Inquiry seems to be the type of argument 
least able to be accommodated by the premise-conclusion structure because, as mentioned 
earlier, inquiry does not necessitate reaching a conclusion.  If a conclusion is reached, it may 
not be definitive but more of a tentative hypothesis generated after consideration of the 
knowledge claims advanced by other scholars.  Instead, if we wish to apply the premise-
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conclusion structure of argument to inquiry, then the notion of ‘conclusion’ requires some re-
interpretation.   
In inquiry, a writer investigates a position or hypothesis with the aim of making a 
judgement on the knowledge claims advanced by other scholars on the position or 
hypothesis.  In doing so, the writer may, after critiquing the literature, arrive at a conclusion 
by assuming a distinct position on the basis of the inquiry.  This position may be consistent 
with the conclusions proposed by other scholars; in other words, the writer assumes an 
established position in the field.  In this sense, the conclusion is very much like the 
conclusion of justification, whereby the writer’s position rests on the reasons proffered by 
other scholars, which help to make the writer’s position acceptable and, thereby, tenable.  
 On the other hand, after surveying the literature or knowledge in the field, the writer 
may not reach a conclusion, as noted by Meiland (1989, p. 189): 
 
In inquiry, one might reach no conclusion about the position or hypothesis being investigated.  One might, 
for example, find good reasons on both sides of the case which seem to cancel each other out.  Or the 
investigation might prove to be so complex, with so many branches and subsidiary lines of argumentation, 
that it might be very difficult to see what it adds up to. 
 
Where a conclusion is not reached, a premise-conclusion structure would appear to be 
an invalid formulation of argument structure.  I contend that a conclusion is, in fact, reached 
after any process of inquiry if we elect to call the judgement, which a writer reaches after 
critiquing the field, the conclusion.  In the case where the writer does not assume a position, 
the writer will inevitably make a judgement that the reasons on both side of the case are good 
and, therefore, a definitive position is not attainable.  This judgement is, in itself, a kind of 
conclusion, one that rests on premises (the reasons advanced on both sides of a position) 
which have equal force and so do not cancel out the conclusions generated by opposing 
scholars.   
Finally, a writer may, after inquiry, generate an original conclusion or new line of 
thought, distinct from the conclusions proffered by other scholars.  In this sense, a conclusion 
is reached but the relationship between the premises and conclusion is quite different to that 
in justification.  In other words, after investigating an established position or hypothesis, the 
writer may draw an indirect conclusion to propose a new position or hypothesis, distinct from 
the position or hypothesis promoted in the field.   The conclusion rests on the same reasons 
provided by other scholars for their position, but the writer draws a new line to reach a 
distinct conclusion.  In this sense, argumentation is heuristic, and inquiry is a mechanism for 
generating new knowledge. 
 
2.2. Rhetorical properties 
 
Persuasion, as a primary use of arguments, functions to make someone adopt a particular 
attitude or assume a particular course of action and is distinct from the use of rhetorical 
strategies in argumentation to link the discursive practice and content of argumentation with 
specific socio-cultural contexts, communicative purposes and audiences.  Consequently, 
when designing analytic models, while it is necessary to move beyond frameworks that skew 
the use of arguments primarily for persuasion, it remains essential to accommodate the 
rhetorical strategies that orators and writers employ to ensure their arguments will hold 
position in the face of opposition and scrutiny.  
In much the same way that Aristotle distinguishes between non-argumentative means 
of persuasion, ethos (character) and pathos (sentiment), and argumentative means of 
persuasion, logos (logic), I would like to distinguish between stylistic and rational persuasion.  
Essentially, stylistic persuasion is the type that is grounded in the literary style of the writer 
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and represents the writer’s interaction with the readers through the use of literary devices for 
‘facilitating communication, supporting a writer’s position and building a relationship with 
an audience’ (Hyland, 1998, p. 438).  Rational persuasion, on the other hand, is ‘the attempt 
to persuade an audience on the basis of the reasons offered’ (Ohler, 2003, p. 67) and is 
integrally linked to the logical component of argumentation.  According to Johnson (2000), 
rational persuasion is the fundamental purpose of argumentation and refers to the dialectical 
obligations an arguer must meet in the process of arguing to counter objections, criticisms or 
alternative positions.  In this section, I will discuss the relevance of using a linguistic 
framework for analysing text metadiscourse to facilitate the explication of that aspect of 
rhetorical structure and function in academic texts that I refer to as stylistic persuasion.  In the 
following section, I will discuss the requirement of a dialectical tier as an essential rhetorical 
strategy of academic argument, a strategy generally known as rational persuasion. 
In investigating rhetorical strategies employed by student writers, text metadiscourse 
becomes a useful indicator of rhetorical strength and purpose.  Metadiscourse, in the sense I 
am using it, refers not only to the surface features of a text that help organize and facilitate 
interpretation of propositional content (such as logical connectives) but also to specific 
linguistic and rhetorical devices that implicitly accommodate the norms and expectations of 
the discourse community and, importantly, convey the communicative intent of the writer 
(Hyland, 1998).  Consequently, while an analysis of metadiscourse reveals insight into the 
ways tertiary writers convey stance, demonstrate their level of commitment to knowledge 
claims, and promote credible representations of their work to readers, I contend that in an 
analytic model of argument, an account of text metadiscourse also permits a functional 
analysis of argument structure by providing insight into the communicative intentions of the 
writer.  Hyland (1998) uses a classification of metadiscourse derived from earlier work of 
Crismore et al. (1993), which not only distinguishes between textual and interpersonal types 
of metadiscourse but also accommodates a writer’s ability to express meaning and promote 
adequacy and acceptability of their arguments in academic texts.  In fact, as metadiscourse is 
inherently linked with rhetorical function, I am proposing that features of metadiscourse will, 
in fact, differ between the three types of academic argument, persuasion, justification and 
inquiry. In my current work, I find that an analysis of metadiscourse provides insight into the 
meanings and functions of text in students’ situational contexts of learning, which 
subsequently facilitates the explication of written argument structures in their texts.  
Furthermore, my early findings suggest that proficiency in various uses of metadiscourse 
affects the structural interpretation and evaluation of students’ written arguments, influencing 
significantly the communicative effect of their academic arguments. Consequently, in 
attempting to discern variation in argumentative practices, especially in second language 
writing contexts, it would appear wise for researchers to incorporate an account of the 
influence of factors such as linguistic proficiency and pragmatic sensitivity on the argument 
patterns generated by writers.  Such an approach, I believe, would more carefully identify 
writers’ intended meanings and avoid merely attributing differences observed in argument 
structures employed by first and second language writers to distinct (and, often, culturally 
stereotypical) styles of reasoning.  
 
2.3. Dialectical properties 
 
A premise-conclusion component will not suffice alone to generate a satisfactory argument in 
academic texts unless accompanied by a dialectical tier, whereby the arguer addresses the 
‘web of arguments, objections, and replies which are relevant to the topic in question’ 
(Meiland, 1989, p. 194).  Johnson (2000, p. 174) points out that Toulmin’s (1958) notion of 
rebuttal is really a narrow conception of dialectical structure, which, in Toulmin’s (1958) 
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framework, is constrained by the jurisprudential model of argument.  Consequently, I contend 
that the model does not accommodate the dialectical strategies of academic argument.  
Defining the contents of the dialectical tier is problematic but Ohler (2003) assumes a 
pragmatic approach by stating, ‘the actualities of the Other, the audience, or the discussion at 
hand must inform the content of the dialectical tier’ (Ohler, 2003, p. 68).  I posit that a 
functional focus located in a pragmatic approach helps to specify the arguer’s dialectical 
obligations.  In other words, the content and quantity of reasons dispelled in the dialectical 
tier of an argument will be contingent on the primary goal of the writer as well as being 
guided by the socio-cognitive and disciplinary expectations of the discourse community.   
For many scholars, persuasion implies a necessary obligation to anticipate the 
readers’ objections and doubts and provide arguments, or reasons, to remove them.  Yet, 
Meiland (1989) contends that ‘in argument for persuasion there seems to be no necessity to 
consider objections’ (Meiland, 1989, p. 194), especially if there is a risk that raising 
objections might weaken the writer’s case and persuade the readers of the opposite of the 
proposed thesis.  In fact, a diminutive dialectical structure is highly probable among student 
writers who lack the knowledge to defend their arguments from potential criticism, so prefer 
not to address objections and, therefore, omit them from their essays.  In such cases, students 
resort to using arguments for persuasion by focussing solely on arguments that support their 
position and resorting to stylistic rhetorical strategies to strengthen their claims to gain the 
readers’ concession. 
In justification, as it is tenable for readers to hold the opposite position of the writer, 
there is less risk that raising objections might weaken the writer’s case.  In using arguments 
to justify, students are participating in a heuristic process, not merely in a process designed to 
induce a change in attitude.  In addition, there is also not the requirement to meet objections 
with the same force of antagonism as in persuasion, since the writer’s position only has to be 
shown to be acceptable and does not need to induce a change in the readers’ position. 
Consequently, writers may provide cautious answers to objections without having to convey 
the strength of appraisal that is necessary to influence the readers’ beliefs in the arguments 
put forth by the writer in persuasion. I contend that, compared with students who use 
arguments for persuasion to induce a change in attitude or incite action, students who use 
arguments for justification of a viewpoint are more likely to recognize the strategy of raising 
objections as an effective means to strengthen a case and so, therefore, attempt to employ the 
strategy in their academic writing. 
In arguments used for inquiry, it would seem beneficial for students to map out the 
dialectical field as much as possible, since in inquiry, the aim is ‘to discover arguments that 
are relevant to a position or thesis and to discover the strength or weaknesses of those 
arguments’ (Meiland, 1989, p. 188).  Raising objections and positing responses to those 
objections in inquiry does not involve adhering to a specified position, as in persuasion and 
justification.  According to Ohler (2003), what to include or exclude as part of the dialectical 
tier is a function of the audience.  I suggest that, as well as being dependent upon criteria 
established by lecturers and disciplinary audiences, the content of the dialectical field will 
also depend upon the specific topic of the writing task as well as a student’s level of 
knowledge and capacity to research the field. A student’s confidence in raising and 
challenging opposite viewpoints will also influence their willingness and ability to dispel 
their dialectical commitments. 
 
3. STRUCTURES OF ACADEMIC ARGUMENT 
 
The kinds of argumentation I propose to be relevant to students’ academic writing can be 
aligned with systemic functional linguistic frameworks of text argument structures previously 
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identified in students’ academic writing (Coffin, 2004).  Figure 1 illustrates how writers 
progressively move through stages of argument, with each stage of argument macrostructure 
performing a function in achieving the goal of argument.  Not all stages are obligatory, with 
those in brackets optional or less likely. 
 
Figure 1: 
A schema of three kinds of argumentation in students’ academic writing  
(adapted from Coffin, 2004, p. 236) 
 
 
Argumentation 
 
 
Persuasion 
 
 
Justification 
 
 
Inquiry 
 
 
Purpose 
 
 
to advocate and support 
a position, and 
recommend an attitude 
or course of action 
 
to put forward and 
support a position, and 
so show claims on 
knowledge to be 
reasonable 
 
to identify arguments 
relevant to a hypothesis 
or position on an issue 
and determine the 
merits of those 
arguments in order to 
reach a judgement or 
determine the ‘best’ 
position on the issue 
 
 
Argument 
Macrostructure 
(Stages) 
 
 
Thesis 
 
Arguments + Evidence 
 
(Counter-Arguments + 
Evidence) 
 
(Reinforcement of 
thesis) 
 
Recommendation 
 
 
Thesis 
 
Arguments + Evidence 
 
Counter-Arguments + 
Evidence 
 
Reinforcement of thesis 
 
Issue 
 
Arguments + Evidence 
(2 or more 
perspectives) 
 
Judgement / Position 
 
A classification of argumentation according to argument function provides a useful 
mechanism for describing the structures of argument.  I contend that the rational, rhetorical 
and dialectical properties of argument may be used to characterize the kinds of argumentation 
in academic discourse and contribute towards understanding the structures and functions of 
academic argument.  A structural approach can, however, be prescriptive, as it imposes a 
rigid organization and structure on each type of argumentation.  Coffin (2004) concedes that 
the Anglo-based framework of systemic functional linguistic argument structures does not 
accommodate structural diversity, a particularly pertinent issue to consider when 
investigating the writing of students from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds.  
Yet, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) point out, ‘we have to bear in mind that 
‘measuring’ something always boils down to imposing an artificial standard – and that 
deviations may arise that call for an explanation’ (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 28).  A 
framework of argument structure provides, therefore, a mechanism for explicating standards 
and norms in the academic context and identifying deviations from the norm.  I argue that the 
framework I propose supports greater diversity in argument practice than the frameworks 
applied in previous studies to the analysis of argument in college compositions and second 
language academic texts.   Importantly, it accommodates structural variation according to 
argument function. I contend that not only does structural variation exist between the major 
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types of argumentation in tertiary academic contexts, but there also exists the potential for 
structural variation within each type of argumentation.  Consequently, the stages of argument 
outlined in Figure 1 are intended merely as a guide to the potential organization of written 
argument within each major type of argumentation.  Furthermore, while I contend that each 
type of argumentation will contain key structural elements, the elements will not be 
constrained to the order specified in systemic functional linguistic frameworks.  For example, 
in persuasion and justification, a writer may choose to present their arguments before stating 
their position, imposing what writing research scholars refer to as an inductive pattern of 
reasoning on text structure (and which has, unfortunately, tended to be generalised as an 
Asian inductive pattern of reasoning).  Furthermore, I contend that we may ultimately 
accommodate a subset of argument macrostructures within each category of argument type, 
which will hopefully reduce the tendency for prescriptivism in research and pedagogy and 
promote the diversity of argumentative practices in contemporary writing contexts. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Using a functional approach, I have attempted to show how rational, rhetorical and dialectical 
aspects of argumentation theory may be used to account for the rhetorical patterns observed 
in students’ written academic arguments.  I have outlined three primary uses of academic 
argument and specified ways for interpreting the rational, rhetorical and dialectical properties 
of each use of argument in academic contexts.  I have attempted to show how a functional 
approach towards argument definition permits structural specification in terms of the 
properties discussed.   
It is my contention that by integrating rational, rhetorical and dialectical properties of 
argument into an analytic framework with applicability for academic contexts, researchers 
may, while specifying a range of commonly accepted academic norms, be better equipped to 
accommodate structural diversity of students’ written arguments and so avoid making rash 
generalisations about both first and second language rhetorical patterns.  Understanding and 
accommodating diversity in academic genres, including written argument, is essential in 
today’s global community where, as Matsuda (1997) so aptly points out, even students from 
similar linguistic, cultural and social backgrounds bring to their learning contexts diverse 
experiences with genres and discourse communities of writing, which inevitably challenge 
the conventions of established disciplinary communities. 
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